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— North County Times (S.Cal.), 29 November 2004

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former 1st Marine Division commander

“Book has 12 chapters, ... 'How Islamic Guerrillas Are Trained'.
— Newport News Daily Press, 12 December 2004

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former Head of Hist. & Museums Div., HQMC

“[T]he insurgency's ... mid-level leaders ... [are] from al-Qaeda, the Lebanese Shiites ... Hezbollah, and ... Iran's Revolutionary Guards, said the author of 'Tactics of the Crescent Moon'.”
— Newhouse News Service, November 2004

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— Col. Robert V. Kane U.S. Army (Ret.)
publisher emeritus, Presidio Press

“John Poole ... [says] that bombing cities ... almost always backfires, because embittered civilians provide more cover to guerrillas and terrorists.”
— Atlantic Monthly, April 2005
To the 241 U.S. Marines who died in the Beirut bombing. May their sacrifice for regional peace be finally rewarded.
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