Download e-book for iPad: Decision and Game Theory for Security: First International by Assane Gueye, Jean C. Walrand, Venkat Anantharam (auth.),

By Assane Gueye, Jean C. Walrand, Venkat Anantharam (auth.), Tansu Alpcan, Levente Buttyán, John S. Baras (eds.)

ISBN-10: 3642171974

ISBN-13: 9783642171970

Securing complicated and networked platforms has develop into more and more vital as those structures play an quintessential position in glossy lifestyles on the flip of the - formation age. simultaneously, safety of ubiquitous communique, info, and computing poses novel study demanding situations. safeguard is a multi-faceted challenge as a result complexity of underlying undefined, software program, and community inter- pendencies in addition to human and social components. It consists of choice making on a number of degrees and a number of time scales, given the constrained assets on hand to either malicious attackers and directors protecting networked platforms. - cision and video game thought offers a wealthy set of analyticalmethods and ways to handle quite a few source allocation and decision-making difficulties coming up in safeguard. This edited quantity includes the contributions awarded on the inaugural convention on selection and video game thought for protection - GameSec 2010. those 18 articles (12 complete and six brief papers) are thematically classified into the subsequent six sections: – “Security investments and making plans” comprises articles, which current optimization tools for (security) investments while dealing with adversaries. – “Privacy and anonymity” has 3 articles discussing situation privateness, - line anonymity, and financial facets of privateness. – “Adversarial and powerful keep watch over” comprises 3 articles, which examine defense and robustness elements of regulate in networks. – “Networksecurityandbotnets”hasfourarticlesfocusingondefensivestra- giesagainstbotnetsaswellasdetectionofmaliciousadversariesinnetworks. – “Authorizationandauthentication”hasanarticleonpasswordpracticesand one other one proposing a game-theoretic authorization version. – “Theory and algorithms for safety” comprises 4 articles on a variety of th- retic and algorithmic elements of security.

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Additional resources for Decision and Game Theory for Security: First International Conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010. Proceedings

Example text

In this case, each time the adversary changes strategy, it reduces its number of eavesdropping stations by one. The adversary obviously stops this removal process when the constraint Γ is satisfied. As nodes do not have any constraints on cost, they just concentrate on their best responses with respect to the new strategy of the adversary. The nodes’ best response if the adversary does not have any eavesdropping station is to deploy a passive mix zone if and only if cip < λi (line 9). In this case, a new local equilibrium appears: (s∗N ,i , s∗A,i ) = (P, A) (line 10).

And a fixed number of unprotected components K: |M| K G= (a(r−z)−(k+t−1))+ t=1 tmax (az−c−(K−i−mi +2))+ i=1 (ar−(k+K)). (5) t=K+1 The contribution of each pentest i to the total profit depends on the round mi when the pentest is commissioned. The second sum of Eq. (5) shows that the marginal benefit of penetration testing increases with the number of rounds in the game. Thus, if a defender decides to commission pentests in round t, then she will keep doing it in each round u > t until all weak links are discovered.

1 For convenience’s sake, we focus in this paper on strict inequalities between benefits and costs. Tracking Games in Mobile Networks 45 Proof. We first distinguish five different cases that encompass all possible scenarios. For four of them, we get pure-strategy Nash equilibria, computed by finding both players’ best responses in Table 1. In the last case, if λi (1 − mi ) < cs < λi cim < λi mi there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, we can derive a mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium. As nodes’ strategy A is dominated by strategy M , it will never be used by the nodes.

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Decision and Game Theory for Security: First International Conference, GameSec 2010, Berlin, Germany, November 22-23, 2010. Proceedings by Assane Gueye, Jean C. Walrand, Venkat Anantharam (auth.), Tansu Alpcan, Levente Buttyán, John S. Baras (eds.)


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